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Response to Superannuation: Assessing Efficiency and Competitiveness: 
Productivity Commission Draft Report, July 2018 
Nicholas Barr1 and Peter Diamond2 
 
Summary 
The Draft Report provides a comprehensive diagnosis, and its proposals offer a significant 
improvement on current arrangements, particularly the elevated standards for MySuper 
products. The report proposes to change the default process based on a provided top-ten 
MySuper list. Workers can choose from the list or from outside the list. Workers who make 
no choice are allocated to a fund in the list on a ‘cab-rank’ basis. Workers changing 
employers without declaring a new provider would stay in their existing fund, whether it was 
a previous choice or resulted from a default.  
The top-ten default design would be superior to current practice, but would be riskier for 
and less supportive of workers than a single default, run by a government agency. This 
submission sets out two strategic reservations about the analysis in the Draft Report: that it 
focusses mainly on a snapshot of the default proposal, with less attention to how the system 
might evolve over time, and that it takes insufficient account of the nature of market 
equilibrium with frictions and incomplete engagement. Our arguments, set out in section 1, 
consider consumers, firms and the industry over time. 
 Concerns about consumers: in designing default arrangements it is necessary to 
consider the effect both on workers being defaulted and on workers who make 
choices. Making a choice and making a choice well are two different things. Workers 
who – through lack of knowledge or lack of effort – make bad choices, can also 
worsen outcomes for other market participants by making higher-price and 
lower-quality options more profitable for suppliers. Thus a good default can 
benefit workers in the default and also workers not in the default. 
 Concerns about firms: a firm offering a good MySuper this year will not necessarily 
still be doing so 20, 30, 40 years hence, as today’s new workers head for retirement. 
To evaluate the lifetime extent of risk borne by those defaulting under the Draft 
Report’s proposal, one would need an extensive study of the dynamics of market 
equilibrium in a system using a periodic listing of top-ten MySupers. Will the same 
firms stay in the top ten indefinitely? If not, what is the risk to defaulted workers? If 
so, will the MySuper market evolve to a small number of large firms and a fringe of 
smaller ones? If the composition of the top ten changes over time, the risk is that 
some workers will do poorly and noticeably less well than others; if the 
composition is fairly static, the risk is that the industry will contract, as in Chile, 
with a small number of firms making above-normal profits. 
 Concerns about the industry: generally, when demanders vary in how thoroughly they 
explore the market before making a decision, there are multiple profit-seeking 
strategies that can be followed by suppliers, resulting in different prices for similar 
goods and different qualities, particularly of aspects that are not easy to evaluate. 
Judging the quality of a fund’s investment decisions is not easy. As noted, adding to a 
market buyers who are less well-informed or less-thorough can make the market work 
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less well. The usefulness of more competition in improving outcomes in markets 
without widespread informed demand-side engagement should not be overstated. 
This is clear from the experiences in Australia and elsewhere.  
We therefore stand by the recommendation in our earlier submission of a single 
government-organised default and, to that end, summarise different ways in which that design 
can be implemented.  We note that individual choice could be influenced by a provided top-
ten list without its being used for a default. Section 2 describes two government-run options 
in use in other countries. 
 A government agency could offer a default together with a limited range of curated 
choices. as is the arrangement in the Premium Pension in Sweden and NEST pensions 
in the UK. 
 Another approach is to limit investments by the government agency to a set of 
existing privately-provided mutual funds, paying a very low fee for the funds, based 
on an auction. These funds are then combined in an age-varying way to provide a 
default. This is the approach of the US Thrift Savings Plan. 
Section 3 sets out our responses to the Draft Report’s concerns about a government-run 
default. Section 4 concludes.  
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1. The Draft Report provides a thoughtful and wide-ranging diagnosis of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the superannuation system and contains many policy recommendations 
that would improve its functioning. In particular, it has identified significant shortcomings in 
the superannuation accumulation process generally, including the treatment of workers who 
are placed in a default. Within the system, there is wide diversity in rates of return net of fees, 
indicating that many workers are not as well served by the system as they might be. This is 
true broadly, as well as for the workers placed by default. Moreover, comparison of costs 
with those in defined-contribution plans abroad indicate that Australia does not do as well as 
some other countries.3 
 
2. In a submission after the previous assessment, we proposed a single default for those 
not choosing a provider, to be run by a government agency. The Draft Report explicitly 
rejects this proposal and puts forward a new design for the allocation of defaulters to 
MySuper funds. This submission identifies potential shortcomings in the Report’s default 
proposal and questions some of its arguments against a government-run default. Our 
conclusions rest on economic analysis and on the experiences in Australia and elsewhere.4 
 
3. Section 1 sets out the bases of our critique, including discussion of the economics 
literature on the nature of market equilibrium over time with frictions and incomplete 
engagement. These analytics question some of the thinking in the Draft Report about the 
outcomes from competition and support our view that a government-run default would be 
superior to the Report’s proposed default design. This section also reports some of the history 
of the Chilean mandatory defined-contribution system, which started in 1981. 
 
4. Section 2 briefly describes some aspects of the government-run defaults in the 
mandatory defined-contribution plan in Sweden and the voluntary opt-out plan in the UK, 
both of which approaches seem to us likely to do much better than the current default process 
in Australia or what we expect would happen under the Report’s recommendations.5  
 
5. Section 3 offers our response to the Draft Report’s concerns about our earlier 
recommendation of a single default run by a government agency. Section 4 concludes. 
 
6. The Draft Report puts forward five policy proposals affecting workers who end up in 
a default.  
(1) Require universal participation by employers and employees in an ATO-run service 
offering an online version of the ‘standard choice’ form through myGov;  
 (2) Publish a list of up to ten ‘best in show’ funds (as a shorthand, referred to below as a 
top ten);  
                                                 
3 “Nevertheless, asset-class data from other countries suggest fees are significantly higher in Australia. Applying 
data on international costs to the aggregate asset allocation in Australia suggests total investment fees should be 
about 0.4 per cent of assets, substantially less than the observed 0.68 per cent.”  (Page 17.) 
4 We have become aware of the call for the “creation of a publicly administered agency which offered a 
centrally-administered, passively managed, alternative fund.” Nicholas Morris, The Cost of Complexity: 
Australian Superannuation, a thesis in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 
UNSW School of Law, September, 2014.  
5 Also discussed is the default in the defined-contribution plan for federal government employees in the US. 
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(3) Allocate new workers who make no choice to these top-ten funds in a rotating 
sequence (cab-rank default);  
(4) Keep workers in the same default when they change employers unless they choose 
otherwise; and  
(5) Revoke MySuper authorisation from funds that for five or more years persistently 
underperform by a material margin an investment benchmark tailored to their asset 
allocation. 
In summary, we agree with the significant value of the first recommendation (a mandatory 
clearing house); we are unsure of the long-run value of (2), periodically publishing a best-in-
show list;  but, alongside such a list, if legislated, argue for the use of a single default fund 
run by a government agency, accompanied by limited curated choice, rather than the cab-rank 
default rule (3); and note problems with default preservation (4) if done in conjunction with 
the cab-rank default rule (3). Revoking the MySuper authorisation of funds performing 
poorly (proposal 5), though entirely appropriate and valuable, is not a complete solution to 
possible declines by a top ten fund previously used as a default.  
 
7. The Draft Report states,  
‘In a world of compulsion the onus is on government to ensure that default super is the 
system exemplar, mitigating the costly (and highly regressive) twin risks for a default 
member: defaulting more than once or into an underperforming product.’ (Page 32.).  
We agree. 
 
1 Analysis of the market for pensions 
1.1 Central issues 
8. Financial markets are complex in that the ‘quality’ of a fund (the skill in investing, the 
prospects of the portion of the worldwide asset market being focused on) is hard to judge and 
varies from supplier to supplier. Moreover, the degree of success in investment varies over 
time for individual suppliers. The points are illustrated by the complexity involved in the 
Commission’s analysis of which funds were doing well. Indeed the Report’s depiction of the 
wide range of average rates of return over the decade to 2016 6 shows the need to recognise 
that market pressures in superannuation differ strongly from those in an idealised competitive 
market. In consequence, overall outcomes differ strongly from those in an idealised 
competitive market. 
 
9. In particular, as noted in the Draft Report, this observation holds for workers who 
have been placed in a default.  
‘DRAFT FINDING 2.3 There is wide variation in performance in the default segment 
that is not fully explained by differences in asset allocation. About 1.7 million member 
                                                 
6 ‘Overall, the system has delivered mixed investment performance for members. – Over the decade to 2016, 
both APRA-regulated funds and SMSFs have delivered net returns of about 5.6 per cent a year (although 
smaller SMSFs delivered significantly less). – Many members are in ‘growth’ and ‘balanced’ products, which 
delivered around 6.8 per cent a year on average in the 12 years to 2016, beating their tailored benchmarks. – The 
default segment generated average net returns of about 7 per cent a year over the 12 years to 2016. Top 
performers were typically (but not always) larger, not-for-profit funds. – For-profit funds as a group, have 
delivered returns below several benchmarks and significantly below not-for-profit funds. These differences do 
not appear to be fully explained by fund size, asset allocation or reported administration expenses.’ (Page 91.) 
Response to Productivity Commission 5 17 July 2018 
 
accounts and $62 billion in assets are in MySuper products that underperformed 
conservative benchmarks over the 10 years to 2017. This suggests that many members are 
currently being defaulted into underperforming products and could be doing better. If all 
members in these underperforming products received the median return from a top-10 
MySuper product, they would collectively be $1.3 billion a year better off. Being in an 
underperforming product means that, on retirement, a typical worker (starting work 
today) is projected to have a balance 36 per cent lower (or $375 000 less to retire with).’ 
(Page 122.) 
 
10. THE TIME DIMENSION. Beyond the issue of the quality of a default MySuper at the time 
a worker is assigned to a default fund, there is the quality to be received by the defaulted 
worker over the rest of his or her working life. The Draft Report’s discussion of four options 
for the design of a default, starting on page 33, focuses on the immediate impact on newly-
defaulted workers without discussion of the time dimension. Under policy (3), workers 
entering the market for the first time without making a choice would be allocated to a 
MySuper product that was viewed as being in the top ten at the time of the worker’s entry 
into the workforce. As these will mainly be young workers, under policy (4), those who 
continue to make no choice would be in the same plan 40 years later. How much confidence 
should there be that a top-ten plan in 2020 continues to be as good over the years to 2060? 
Across the economy generally, many large, successful firms fade over time. If that were to 
happen to some top-ten MySuper funds, the government would not be taking continuing 
direct responsibility for people relying on the government to keep them in a good MySuper.  
 
11. PROPOSED SAFEGUARD. The safeguard in the Draft Report is that a plan’s status would 
be revoked if it was bad enough (policy (5)) 
‘Funds that fail to meet [the relevant] conditions — or persistently underperform (for five 
or more years) an investment benchmark tailored to their asset allocation by a material 
margin, as determined by APRA — should have their MySuper authorisation revoked.’ 
(Page 59). 
‘Where a fund loses MySuper authorisation, members in this product will then need to 
either actively choose to remain, or otherwise be transferred to a better fund (which must 
hold MySuper authorisation). APRA will need to oversee this process to ensure 
remaining members’ interests are protected.’ (p. 465.) 
 
12. The general approach of revoking authorisation from funds that become sufficiently 
poor for sufficiently long is clearly correct and clearly useful to help workers who chose a 
fund that has done poorly. However, the process provides only weak support for a defaulter 
relying on being protected by the government.  
 Revocation will generally occur only after five or more years of underperformance. 
 Firms doing poorly may pursue investment strategies aimed at avoiding losing their 
authorisation. This may involve taking on considerable risk, a risk borne by the 
defaulted workers.  
 Anticipating the possibility of revocation a fund family may successfully merge with 
an ongoing MySuper fund that is not doing as badly, but is not doing well. Moreover, 
the fund company can also encourage workers to move into their other funds. Thus, 
the full implications of the risk of a loss of authorisation are not simple to foresee.  
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 The approach might incentivise a strategy in which a top ten fund seeks to accumulate 
inattentive workers and to increase fees slowly thereafter  – an example of the risk of 
unintended consequences. Building a reputation and then milking it occurs in many 
markets. 
Thus revocation on its own is not adequate to satisfy an onus on government that ‘default 
super is the system exemplar.’ 
 
13. Nor does the discussion include the impact of the default process on the behaviour 
over time of profit- and non-profit firms offering superannuation plans. More generally, the 
Report does not discuss the impact of publication of a top-ten list on outcomes in the 
superannuation market. Yet, there is an extensive literature on the behaviour over time of 
mutual fund markets generally, reflecting the behaviour both of investors and of firms. 
Analyses of information-impacted markets with continuous customer participation (which 
includes many retail markets) explore the incentives for firms in following diverse strategies 
in pricing, product design, and advertising. Over time, the evolution of customers with 
ongoing connections to particular suppliers is also important for the strategies that firms 
adopt. Thus one cannot merely cite ‘encourage more competition’ as support for a policy 
proposal. Changes in the regulatory framework of competition will have complex effects, 
with diverse impacts over time on different demanders and on firm strategies. In particular, it 
is necessary to consider the effect of different default arrangements both for workers who 
make no choice and for those who choose among suppliers. The latter are affected by the 
evolution over time of individual funds and by the overall shape of the industry. Thus 
workers making choices can be hurt by the industry response to the presence of more workers 
who are not doing a good job of evaluating their alternatives.  
 
14. The rest of this section considers consumer behaviour (section 1.2) and the behaviour 
of firms and possible evolutions of the industry (section 1.3). 
 
1.2 The role of consumer engagement  
15. THE ISSUE. Central to our criticism of the Draft Report’s analysis are different 
perceptions of what to expect from trying to induce more competitive pressure in the market 
by those tending to default. In particular, though improving some aspects of consumer 
engagement can be desirable, we regard the emphasis on more competition as overstated. In 
the textbook picture of a competitive market for a homogeneous good, everyone knows the 
full range of prices at which the homogeneous good is offered. An implication of this 
knowledge and the assumption that demanders act on it is the ‘law of one price,’ the 
conclusion that the homogeneous good will sell at the same price everywhere. Perhaps the 
type of mutual fund that is closest to a homogeneous product is an index fund for a familiar 
index. Consider the S&P 500 index funds in the US – a highly developed market with large 
numbers of investors, many of whom are financially literate and sophisticated. As shown in 
Figure 1, the charges being made by these funds are very diverse.7 Diverse charges 
compound over time to make a big difference in outcomes from saving over a career, as 
repeatedly (and rightly) discussed in the Report.  
 
  
                                                 
7 Since 2000, the use of index funds in the US has grown significantly. We are not aware of a study that updates 
this data, but see no reason to expect a radically different picture. 
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Figure 1  Retail and Institutional S&P 500 Funds, Price Histograms, 2000  
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Source: Figure II., Hortacsu, A. & Syverson, C., 2003. Product Differentiation, Search Costs, 
and Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: A Case Study of the S&P 500 Index Funds.  
 
16. Two sets of questions arise: how many workers will choose and how well will they 
choose? Getting more workers to choose rather than default may not be helpful. 
 
17. HOW MANY WORKERS WILL CHOOSE?  The Commission’s research suggests that many 
workers will make choices.  
... some new workforce entrants will inevitably not make a choice. The Commission’s 
experimental survey … suggests relatively few people will fall into this category — with 
over 95 per cent of respondents who received a recommended shortlist of 4 to 8 funds 
making a choice; and over 80 per cent of respondents selecting a fund from the shortlist’ 
(Page 444). 
While agreeing that providing a top-ten list is likely to induce more choice, it needs to be 
recognised that a quantitative inference needs to adjust for the extent to which an 
experimental setting is different from having access to a list in the midst of the process of 
entering the labour force or changing jobs. 
 
18. In addition, the continued wide use of a default by new entrants in the differently 
organised defined-contribution plans in other countries should be noted. In Sweden about 
98% of new workers enter the default (Barr 2013, Table 5.1); and in the UK 99% of new 
members of NEST go into the default arrangement.8 The Draft Report notes: ‘Up to two-
thirds of members default when starting a new job, and about half the accounts in the super 
system are in MySuper (default) products — representing 24 per cent ($635 billion) of 
system assets.’ (Page 25). If this pattern of limited choosing continues, under policy (4), the 
                                                 
8 Pers.com., 20 October 2016. 
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system would continue the previous default of these workers into a fund that was top-ten 
some years ago, and may or may not still be in that category. Perhaps the new system will 
induce more workers to be engaged but, as discussed below, engagement by those with 
limited attention to the choice may not have positive effects on equilibrium. 
 
19. HOW WELL WILL WORKERS CHOOSE? Over the last 40 years, there have been many 
analyses of markets reporting a diversity of prices for similar goods, and developing theories 
of why that is the case and how the distribution of prices relates to the distribution of 
customer types.9 When demanders vary in how thoroughly (in terms both of knowledge and 
effort) they explore the market before making a purchase, there can be diverse satisfactory 
profit-seeking strategies to be followed by suppliers using different prices. Moreover, when 
products can differ in characteristics, diversity in qualities is common as well, including those 
aspects that are hard for demanders to evaluate. In such a market, adding buyers who are less 
knowledgeable and/or who make less effort can make the market worse for the set of people 
already there. This worsening can follow from new demanders who make higher-price and 
lower-quality options more profitable for suppliers, thereby making more complicated the 
effort by some people to explore the market. Rather than seeking to increase ‘engagement’ in 
the market by the workers taking the default, the use of a good default may help others as 
well as those taking the good default MySuper. 
 
20. This wide deviation from an idealised competitive equilibrium is widespread and 
remains common even with online markets.  
‘…price dispersion is ubiquitous and persistent. Regardless of the particular product 
(tinplate cans or PDAs), the venue in which they are sold (online or offline, in the US or 
abroad), or the time period (1901 or 2005).’ 
‘Despite the widespread adoption of inventions such as the automobile, the telephone, 
television, and the Internet, price dispersion is still the rule rather than the exception in 
homogeneous product markets. Reductions in information costs over the past century 
have neither reduced nor eliminated the levels of price dispersion observed in 
homogeneous product markets.’10 
Thus, it is important to examine the details of market outcomes with different regulatory rules 
rather than simply assuming that more competition makes outcomes better. 
  
21. Studies of the US financial market find that flows into and out of mutual funds are 
strongly influenced by recent returns. The Draft Report offers no reasons for expecting 
behaviour in Australia to be different from this pattern. Moreover, the published selection of 
a top ten is likely to induce shifts among super funds and includes returns in the process of 
selection.  
‘But, given the primacy of net returns to retirement balances (chapter 2), the key focus of 
the selection process should be on a fund’s likelihood of producing high net returns for 
members. (page 435, emphasis in original).  
                                                 
9 See Michael R. Baye, John Morgan, Patrick Scholten. 2006. ‘Information, Search, and Price Dispersion’, in T. 
Hendershott, ed. Handbook on Economics and Information Systems. Elsevier. 
10 Michael R. Baye, John Morgan, Patrick Scholten, op. cit. p. 370. 
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While attention may be to a longer period of history, recent returns are likely to matter as 
well.  
22. IN SUM. It is plausible that the presence of a top ten list would decrease defaulting, 
without being confident of the exact extent. However, a large increase in the numbers making 
a choice may or may not be a good outcome.11 For workers who choose a top ten-fund that 
does not fit well for their needs, it may not be a good outcome; considerable evidence12 
shows widespread poor financial literacy even in OECD countries; and, as we discuss next, 
the presence of people making poorly understood choices can influence supply. 
 
1.3 Responses by firms and evolution of the industry 
23. To evaluate the lifetime extent of risk borne by those defaulting under the Draft 
Report’s proposal, one would need an extensive understanding of the dynamics of market 
equilibrium in a system using a periodic listing of top-ten MySupers both to allocate 
defaulters and to inform workers who are considering choosing or reconsidering their super 
provider. There is also the issue of how the top ten will be presented. Beyond the cab-rank 
use of the list as a default, the way the list is organised will influence workers choosing a 
fund, both new entrants and existing covered workers, perhaps particularly when changing 
employers. Will the list be presented as a ranked order, particularly encouraging choice of the 
top one or two? Or will there be an attempt to present all ten on equal terms, perhaps by 
varying the order of presentation in different printed and online publications. Whatever 
method is used, the order of presentation is likely to affect the evolution of the industry. The 
Draft Report documents the need for significant changes in the industry, and views 
revocations of MySuper status as an important source of improvement, a view we share. 
However, there are likely to be changes over time beyond just the disappearance of some 
firms and the upgrading of others at risk of losing authorisation. How that evolution of the 
superannuation industry would vary with the design of the default is important, whether a 
top-ten list is presented and however it is presented. But the Draft Report does not discuss the 
evolution of the industry in response to regulatory changes. 
 
24. HOW MIGHT FIRMS RESPOND? The dynamics of firm behaviour in a market with large 
numbers of demanders with limited attention or understanding illustrates how the presence of 
such people can influence supply. The literature on US mutual fund markets examines the 
responses of firms over time to measured movements into and out of funds in response to 
reports of recent returns. Seeking an increase in the funds invested with them, providers of 
mutual funds have an incentive to influence demand by the design of their portfolios and by 
their advertising. Beyond the basic role of sustained decisions in seeking particular risk-
                                                 
11 As one of the witnesses pointed out, 
‘there’s a difference between active engagement and people being interested. A far greater proportion of people 
are interested in superannuation but don’t make active decisions such as changing investment options or 
changing funds. We found that there was a close relationship between interest and people searching for 
information, getting onto the website and looking for things. So you don’t actually have to be actively doing 
things to be interested.  We have to be careful what we’re talking about here with engagement and people being 
interested (Evidence from Hazel Bateman. Transcript of Proceedings, 20 June 2018, pp. 79-80). 
12 On financial literacy in the USA, see US Federal Research Division (2011), ‘Financial Literacy among Retail 
Investors in the United States’, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, and for international evidence, 
Annamaria Lusardi and Olivia S. Mitchell (2014), ‘The Economic Importance of Financial Literacy: Theory and 
Evidence.’ Journal of Economic Literature, 52(1): 5-44. 
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return combinations, prior to the time of a report on returns, firms with similar basic 
strategies but different patterns of returns to date have different incentives for taking on risk 
and do behave differently – funds less confident of having a good report tend to take on more 
risk than those more confident. It is not clear how different would be the behaviour of 
providers of superannuation funds from US mutual funds given the difference in regulation, 
including the need for trustees to be concerned about the workers. But, plausibly, the same 
pattern will hold, implying that the top-ten process will affect fund risk-taking in anticipation 
of the selection process.  
 
25. Thus the risk is that over the longer-term, a firm offering a good MySuper this year 
will not necessarily still be doing so 20, 30, 40 years hence, as today’s new workers head for 
retirement.13 The extent of decreased quality is somewhat limited by the risk of losing 
authorisation. As discussed earlier, however, that safeguard may not be as effective as it 
appears at first glance.  
 
26. If having a top-ten list seems useful, periodic announcements could take place without 
using the list as the basis for defaults. Such announcements, in pursuit of the Report’s goal to 
‘improve engagement and simplify choice’, can be combined with a single government-run 
default, i.e. the design decouples the top-ten list for workers who wish to choose from the 
default for workers who make no choice. With the default also available as a choice (as in 
Sweden), the presence of a government-run default may enhance competition, as appears to 
be the case with the presence of MySupers offered by nonprofits. Moreover, if experience 
were to question the value of a sustained top-ten list over the long-run, the presence of a 
single government-run default would facilitate revisions to the design of any such list.  
 
27. HOW MIGHT THE INDUSTRY EVOLVE? Will all the same firms in the initial top ten stay 
there indefinitely? If the firms change over time, chosen from a relatively large set of 
suppliers, the concerns set out above – the operation of markets with large number of poorly-
informed or inattentive buyers and limited effectiveness of proposed safeguards – continue to 
apply. On the other hand, if there is little change in the set of top-ten firms, there is likely to 
be a major evolution of the industry. Will the MySuper market evolve into a small number of 
large firms and a fringe of smaller ones? If the latter, how well will competition work? While 
some shrinkage, focused on the worst performers is to be welcomed, the shrinkage may 
extend more widely than that, and over time the industry could become dominated by a small 
number of firms, as happened in Chile, with a small number of firms making above-normal 
profits. Will the outcomes be as good as they might be? Are the outcomes different with 
different defaults even if the top ten listing is done the same? We do not have answers to 
these questions, but regard the top-ten approach as a leap into a new market structure that 
may well have significant unanticipated effects. 
 
                                                 
13 It might be informative to track MySuper fund performances over time, although the time period with useful 
data is limited. We note that the Draft Report stated:  
‘26 of today’s MySuper products — that can be tracked back over 10 years — underperformed, and 
represent 13 per cent ($62 billion) of MySuper assets and 15 per cent (1.7 million) of member accounts in 
the sample. There is a material gap between top and bottom performers. – A member entering the system 
today into the median underperforming MySuper product is projected to retire with 36 per cent less ($375 
000) in retirement than if they entered one in the median top-10 product.’ (Page 91.) 
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28.  As a start to considering industry evolution, Box 1 summarises the evolution of 
competition in the mandatory defined-contribution system in Chile. This may provide 
insights into how the MySuper industry might evolve despite significant differences between 
Chile and Australia in initial position and in the details of rules.14 Lacking an empirical basis 
for seeing how a system similar to the proposed design has worked elsewhere, it would be 
good to have plausible theoretical modelling of financial market equilibria over time under 
such a regime. We are not aware of such modelling.  
 
Box 1  Experience in Chile 
The mandatory defined-contribution plan initiated by Chile in 1981 illustrates our argument that the 
usefulness of competition in this context should not be overstated. In Chile, each of the available 
funds has its own default. What is noteworthy is that a system designed to rely on competitive 
pressures has seen repeated overhauls of the competitive process in light of dissatisfaction with the 
outcomes, particularly the fees charged by the funds. Moreover, with a target of free entry there was 
little in the way of regulations to make it difficult for a free-standing financial firm to enter.15 
Nevertheless, there has been significant shrinkage of the number of suppliers – in 1982, when the 
system rolled out, there were 12 firms. The number rose to 21 in 1994, but there are only 6 firms 
currently. The rate of return on capital of these providers is above normal.16 But it is also the case that 
the fees inside the system appear to be less than those in the open market, presumably a result of the 
combination of a mandate and a tight regulatory structure.  
We note that starting in 2008, Chile introduced an auction mechanism for defaulting new 
entrants. After a bidding process, a single firm became the supplier of new entrants who made no 
other choice, with the requirement to use its winning fee structure for all of its current participants. 
 
29. IN SUM. The importance of the intertemporal links based on the behavioural responses 
of workers and firms undercuts the relevance for the superannuation market of the Report’s 
observation that  
‘In a competitive system, funds would have an incentive to minimise their costs for a 
given return and to align their fees with those costs.’ (Page 128).  
In terms of the government’s obligation to mandated workers who do not choose, and so rely 
on the government to see that they are well treated, we question the appropriateness of an 
arrangement in which performance can vary across workers who have made no choice and 
hence are defaulted into one of the top-ten funds and then left there. And we question the 
value of inducing choice from workers who are not necessarily equipped to do so well. 
 
2 Different designs of a default 
30. There are different approaches to default (with limited curated choice) that might 
serve as models for Australia.  
 A government agency could offer a default together with a limited range of curated 
choice. In the Premium Pension in Sweden, a mandatory defined-contribution plan for 
the entire workforce, the government agency has two underlying safe and risky funds, 
the risky fund investing in a wide range of types of assets world-wide. The default 
                                                 
14 See Chile Presidential Advisory Commission on the Pension System (2015), Report, (the Bravo Report) for 
discussion of the evolution of the system (pp. 51-59) and the current performance of pension funds (pp. 72-79). 
15 Other than the fund being a stand-alone enterprise, for example, not a subsidiary of a bank. 
16 Chile Presidential Advisory Commission on the Pension System, op. cit. 
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fund is a lifecycle combination of these two funds.  Thus the options for individuals in 
the Premium Pension are (a) to do nothing and go into the age-appropriate default 
fund, or (b) choose a combination of the two underlying funds, and/or (c) choose a 
portfolio including some of the many privately provided funds. As summarised 
below, a similar approach to default is taken by NEST pensions, an auto-enrolment 
plan in the UK.  
 Another approach is to limit investments by the government agency to a set of 
existing privately provided mutual funds. These funds would charge the government 
agency very low fees, based on an auction. These funds are combined in an age-
varying way to provide a default. This is the approach of the US Thrift Savings Plan, 
a defined-contribution plan for US federal government employees. Since the Thrift 
Savings Plan uses index funds, the difference in fees is the prime difference between 
funds, unlike managed funds where the choice of allocation across types of assets as 
well as the degree of success in selections within categories result in additional 
sources of varying returns.17 
These approaches differ strongly in the allowed scope of government agency activity and the 
link to the existing capital market. Which approach is more suitable for a particular country 
depends on the extent of the willingness to rely on government actions and the likely success 
of such actions, both of which vary across countries.  
 
31. THE SWEDEN DEFAULT. In the original design, workers who made no choice were 
placed in the default fund (known as AP7).  More recently, workers could choose to have 
their portfolio with AP7 and were given limited surrounding choice. 
 
32. AP7 organises an Equity Fund and a Fixed Income Fund. Individuals who make no 
choice go into the default fund, which is made up of the equity and fixed income funds in 
proportions which vary with age. Up to age 55, 100 per cent is allocated to the equity fund. 
From age 56 to 75 the allocation is rebalanced annually toward the fixed income fund until 
reaching an allocation of 2/3 fixed income fund and 1/3 equity fund  at the age of 75.   
 
33. Within the AP7 arrangement, workers who wish to do so can choose to invest in a 
mix of the equity and fixed income funds directly or through three different proportions that 
are maintained through rebalancing, depending on how much risk they wish to take. 
 
34. Administrative charges are low. In 2016, for the entire Premium Pension, 
administrative charges were .07% and capital management costs and charges 0.28% 
excluding annuity insurance administration. Capital management charges by AP7 were less 
than half of the overall average.18 
 
35. THE US THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN. The Thrift Savings Plan has a fund of US government 
debt and four index funds:  
 The G (government securities) fund is based on US government bonds;  
 The F (fixed income) fund is based on a broader range of bonds including US 
corporate bonds and foreign government bonds issued in the US;  
                                                 
17 A top ten restricted to a single well-defined index fund would be different from one open to all types of funds. 
18 Orange Report 2016:Annual Report of the Swedish Pension System, pp. 38,  40 and 41, and AP7 website. 
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 The C (commons stocks) fund tracks the stocks in the S&P 500;  
 The S (small capitalization) fund tracks the stocks of small and medium size 
companies;  
 The I (international) fund tracks the stocks of large companies in more than 20 
developed countries. 
In addition 
 The L (life-cycle) fund is made up of age-varying combinations of these five funds. 
 
36. An individual can choose a combination of the six funds.  An individual who makes 
no choice is placed in the lifecycle fund targeted at the year that the worker turns 62.19 
 
37. The overall costs of the Thrift Savings Plan are very low because it is dealing with a 
single employer. More relevant for Australia is that the charges paid for the mutual funds that 
make up its portfolio are very low. 
 
38. NEST PENSIONS IN THE UK. A government agency provides NEST pensions for firms 
with no other pension plan for their workers. For such firms it is mandatory to offer NEST 
pensions. The firm’s workers are automatically enrolled but can opt out. NEST picks the 
types of individual funds to be used in the portfolios made available, selecting individual 
funds from private firms on a competitive basis. NEST offers workers five choices based on 
the individual funds: target-date, higher-risk, lower risk, ethical and Sharia. A worker who 
makes no choice is put into the target-date fund aimed at the year in which he/she reaches 
state pension age.20   
 
39. While in Sweden the government agency chooses investment, in the NEST (UK) and 
TSP (US) defaults, competition by private funds for investments of defaulters is not for 
individual workers but for the right to manage a portion of the plan’s pension savings.  
 
 
3 Response to the Draft Report’s concerns about a government-run default 
40. The report argues against a single default21 on the grounds that: 
‘A government monopoly default fund, suggested by some experts, could realise 
economies of scale within the system and simplify the whole process — but at the cost of 
abandoning  any attempt to both improve engagement and simplify choice. And it would 
run counter to the (desirable) absence of an actual or implied government guarantee in the 
                                                 
19 To be more specific, the G Fund is invested in U.S. Treasury securities with interest based on the market 
yields of all U.S. Treasury securities with more than 4 years to maturity. The F Fund is invested to track the 
Bloomberg Barclays U.S. Aggregate Bond Index. The C Fund is invested to track the Standard & Poor's 500 
(S&P 500) Stock Index. The S Fund is invested in to track the Dow Jones U.S. Completion Total Stock Market 
(TSM) Index. The I Fund is invested to track the MSCI EAFE (Europe, Australasia, Far East) Index.  
20 The NEST lifecycle pattern has 3 phases rather than the customary two: a foundation phase, a growth phase, 
and a consolidation phase. Recognising loss aversion, during the foundation phase (the first 5 or so years) the 
worker’s savings are managed conservatively. Only when there is a solid base does the investment strategy 
move the portfolio into growth-seeking assets. Thus the design is intended to avoid short-run losses;  and the 
consolidation phase is intended to lock in gains as a worker approaches retirement age. 
21 The issue is discussed in detail in Box 12.7, pages 451-2. 
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Australian superannuation system and would fail to harness the benefits of a competitive 
process’ (p. 425).  
 
41. QUALITY OF DEFAULT. Either a government agency or a top-ten default would be 
better for many workers than defaulting under the current design. Above, we have spelled out 
the risks over working life to someone defaulted into a top-ten fund. From the perspective of 
such a worker, a government-run default with a good portfolio avoids the risks of the 
evolution of different funds that were in the top ten at different times in the past. A 
significantly better default may also be chosen by some well-informed workers.22 The Report 
raises additional issues about the government-run default beyond this comparison.  
    
42. IMPROVING ENGAGEMENT AND SIMPLIFYING CHOICE. It is important to separate 
(a) issues associated with having a top-ten list and (b) the choice of a default if there is a top-
ten list. If there is a strong case to have a best-in-show list, that can be done without its use as 
a default. The presence of the list would affect engagement and would simplify choice. Given 
the list, how different the level of engagement and the degree of simplification between a 
cab-rank default and a government-organized default is unclear and does not seem likely to 
have large effects. Thus, we do not consider use of a government-run default as ‘abandoning  
any attempt to both improve engagement and simplify choice’. Moreover, as we have argued, 
expanding engagement and improving engagement are not the same.  
 
43. How the pattern of well- and ill-informed and ill-engaged workers in the active 
market would be different with different defaults and how that would matter is not simple to 
evaluate. Whether the effects of having a top-ten list would be better including a cab-rank 
default or not including that default is again a complex question. Moreover, one would also 
want to evaluate the impact of the presence of a government-run option on competition in the 
industry. As to simplifying choice, in total, workers inclined to review their placement in a 
default should find that review easier when all defaulters are in the same fund than when they 
are scattered across multiple funds, plausibly more than ten as the top ten varies over time.   
 
44. As well as the ability to fit with a top-ten list, the proposed single default also has the 
ability to fit with policy for workers in existing default arrangements. Three issues arise.  
 The Draft Report wants to address existing multiple accounts coming from multiple 
defaults. That issue can be addressed in the same way in either the top-ten approach or 
with a default organised by a government agency.  
 The Draft Report recognises some funds that are doing so badly that they may lose 
their MySuper authorisation. Again, that option is available with both organizational 
approaches.  
 Should previous defaulters be left in plans in which they were defaulted or moved 
over time into the new default arrangements? A concern is the possibility of 
instability from too sudden and too large a move. Again, with both organizational 
approaches, there are options to move people slowly from some of the plans, or do 
nothing further.  
 
                                                 
22 At the start of the Premium Pension in Sweden, the only way to be in the default was by not returning the 
form selecting a portfolio. Some sophisticated investors, viewing the default as best, did not return the form. 
Later, the regulations allowed people to choose one of the options provided by the government agency providing 
the default. 
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45. IMPLICIT GUARANTEES. It may be argued that a single default might be regarded as 
having an implicit guarantee. Indeed, the possibility of political pressure to address concerns 
about outcomes is always present. Since we are not knowledgeable about Australian politics, 
we merely want to identify that the extent of political pressure will depend on the context. 
 Would there be a call for a response if it was discovered that some of the default (or 
chosen) plans were frauds which left workers with no funds? Issues reflecting 
government regulatory failure with different degrees of relative impact across workers 
may have different degrees of salience.  
 Presumably an extended period of low returns globally would be viewed with regret, 
but would not call for the same sort of response (although some policy changes might 
be appropriate). 
 An arrangement with multiple default funds faces the risk that people with similar 
earnings records experience very different outcomes. That risk arises both where a 
worker has been allocated to a default and where he/she has made a choice from the 
top 10. If outcomes vary significantly might this call for a response? 
The government has mandated participation. A top-10 ranking is an explicit recommendation, 
a default fund is an implicit recommendation. In some circumstances, there will be pressure 
on government to offset major harm from the government’s mandate and government 
regulation, whether the government runs a default or not.  
 
46. QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT. The report raises concerns about how well 
the government would do in running a default. There is widespread awareness of 
underfunding of government defined-benefit plans for public employees notwithstanding the 
intention that the plan should be fully funded.23 As MySuper is a defined-contribution plan, 
underfunding is not an issue, although the quality of investment must be considered. Some 
countries invest well through funds run by a government-agency, such as that for the defined-
benefit Canada Pension Plan and the default for the Swedish Premium Pension. Yet it is 
common to see poor investments, for example with requirements to hold excessive amounts 
of government debt to address fiscal concerns. This concern can arise with government-run 
funds and with privately-run pensions, which can be mandated to hold government debt, as, 
for example, in Argentina and Hungary. Similarly excessive encouragement to invest 
domestically can arise in both government-run plans and mandates to privately-run plans. 
The approach of having a government agency use private investment firms as in the United 
States and the United Kingdom can limit some of those political pressures. Whether the 
quality of government in Australia is better suited to direct investment for the default (with or 
without reliance on purchased private funds), or to regulation of private investment in 
defaults is a question for the Productivity Commission, not us.   
 
 
4 Conclusion 
47. The Draft Report provides a comprehensive diagnosis, and its proposals offer a 
significant improvement on current arrangements, particularly the elevated standards for 
MySuper products.  
 
                                                 
23 This is separate from national plans, like the Age Pension, which were not designed to be fully funded.  
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48. The specific arrangement for defaults, cab-rank allocation to the funds on the top-ten 
list, however, risks being unfair to defaulted workers and is not helpful for efficiency. In 
designing default arrangements it is necessary to consider the effect both on workers being 
defaulted and on workers who make choices. It is necessary also to consider the behaviour 
over time of firms and the evolution of the industry.  Our main arguments are fourfold.  
 Making a choice and making a good choice are two different things. 
 Workers who – through lack of knowledge or lack of effort – make bad choices, can 
also worsen outcomes for other market participants; thus a good default can benefit 
workers in the default and also workers not in the default. 
 The usefulness of competition in improving outcomes in markets without widespread 
informed demand-side engagement should not be overstated. This is clear from the 
experiences in Australia and elsewhere.  
 If the composition of the top ten changes over time, the risk is that some workers will 
do noticeably less well than others; if the composition is fairly static, the risk is that 
the industry will contract, as in Chile, with a small number of firms making above-
normal profits. 
 
49. For these reasons,  
 We continue to favour the use of a government-organised default with curated choice, 
and with funds managed either in house (as in Sweden), or with different parts of the 
portfolio provided by private firms selected through competition, as in the US Thrift 
Savings Plan and NEST, 
 A combination of a government-organised default with a top-ten list would offer 
flexibility for any future adjustment of the design or operation of the list. 
 In contrast, we view the use of a cab-rank top-ten default as a more risky design for 
the future of superannuation. We think it is important to acknowledge the 
government’s obligation, as stated in the Draft Report: 
‘In view of the compulsory and complex nature of superannuation, default 
arrangements reflect the duty of government to ensure the interests of these 
employees are protected.’  (Page 426). 
‘Government’s duty to protect members is of heightened importance in a defined 
contribution system where most financial risks lie with the individual:  in relation 
to investment performance, fees and ultimately the benefit in retirement.’ (Page 
456). 
 
